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Abstract: Many degree programs in science and engineering aim at enabling their students to perform 
interdisciplinary problem solving. In this paper we present three types of expertise that are involved in 
different ways in interdisciplinary problem solving. In doing so we shall first characterise two important 
epistemological challenges commonly faced in interdisciplinary problem solving, namely the communication 
challenge that arises from the use of different concepts within different scientific domains, and the integration 
challenge that arises from the differences between domain-specific epistemological standards. Next, drawing 
on recent work on expertise developed within science studies, we characterize the interactional expertise that 
is a precondition for scientists to communicate across scientific domains, and the integrational expertise that is 
a precondition for scientists to be able to integrate cognitive resources originating in different domains. Finally, 
we shall analyse how different types of interdisciplinary problem solving sets different requirements for 
interactional and integrational expertise and discuss the implications for science and engineering programs in 
higher education.         
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1 Introduction 
It is often argued that the complexity of the challenges that face society today – from cancer to climate change 
– makes them inherently interdisciplinary, requiring an integrated interdisciplinary approach to be solved (e.g. 
(NAS 2004)). There is therefore a global trend to promote interdisciplinary research and innovation that cuts 
across the traditional science and engineering disciplines. A striking example is the National Nanotechnology 
Initiative in the USA which in 2014 alone will spend an estimated $1.5 billion on research and education in 
nanotechnology1. Other examples of interdisciplinary research fields that are receiving increased attention and 
funding in these years include biotechnology, environmental science and systems biology.  
The vision that more of tomorrow’s problem solving should be interdisciplinary affects today’s higher 
education. It is here that tomorrow’s interdisciplinary practitioners are being trained, often through special 
interdisciplinary programs that draw on different domains from science and technology2. Students in these 
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interdisciplinary programs have to divide their time between these multiple domains and therefore cannot be 
expected to gain the same kind and degree of expertise in all these domains as traditional, monodisciplinary 
specialists. Although often raised as a concern, this need not necessarily be a problem, as the aims of the two 
types of educational programs are not identical. The important point is to make it transparent what kind of 
expertise the students gain from their education and how their specific expertise profile relates to the kind of 
interdisciplinary problem solving that they are expected to engage in.  
Research in higher education on the expertise that students in interdisciplinary programs need to acquire in 
order to participate in interdisciplinary problem solving and the kind of training needed for students to acquire 
this expertise has remained limited and to a large extent explorative (fore reviews see (Borrego, Newswander 
2010, Spelt et al. 2009)). Further, while the literature on interdisciplinarity is relatively rich in the humanities, 
social- and health sciences, there has been less tradition for analyses of interdisciplinary processes across 
different domains within the natural and engineering sciences (Borrego, Newswander 2010). In this paper we 
therefore focus explicitly on interdisciplinary problem solving in the natural and engineering sciences, the 
challenges it involves, and the expertise needed to overcome these challenges. 
The paper proceeds as follows: First, we shall characterize two general epistemic challenges faced in 
interdisciplinary problem solving, namely a) how to establish efficient communication across different scientific 
domains and b) how to integrate cognitive resources from different scientific domains. Next, drawing and 
elaborating on analyses of expertise developed within science studies, we introduce a distinction between 
contributory, interactional and integrational expertise that can be used to describe the different kinds of 
expertise needed for interdisciplinary problem solving. Finally, we shall briefly discuss how science and 
engineering programs in higher education can train students to obtain these various kinds of expertise.  
2 Two epistemic challenges faced in interdisciplinary problem solving      
Interdisciplinary problem solving is characterized by aiming for a significant degree of integration of 
knowledge, methods, models and other cognitive resources from a number of different domains.3  Here we 
take an integrated solution to a problem, to be a solution which as a minimum is acceptable relative to the 
epistemological standards of all domains involved in the problem solving process (see Introduction). We shall 
here focus on interdisciplinary problem solving that draws on and integrates cognitive resources from a 
number of different domains within the natural and engineering sciences.  
Interdisciplinary problem solving is commonly said to be wide when it integrates resources originating in very 
different disciplines such as, for example, chemistry and ecology, and narrow when it takes place between sub-
disciplines within the same broader discipline (Klein 2010), such as integration of cognitive resources from 
multiple biological sub-disciplines (Bechtel 1986). Our analysis shall encompass both narrow and wide 
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interdisciplinarity with the aim of clarifying the difference in expertise profiles that is required for narrow and 
broad interdisciplinarity, respectively. 
It is well-documented that interdisciplinary problem solving poses special challenges, exactly because it draws 
on and integrates cognitive resources from different domains. This has been described in first-hand 
contemporary accounts from practitioners (e.g. (Öberg 2009, Campbell 2005, Lélé, Norgaard 2005, Jakobsen, 
Hels & McLaughlin 2004)), in historical and contemporary case studies from science studies (e.g. (Brigandt 
2010; Galison 1997; Bechtel 1986)), and in accounts by educators involved in interdisciplinary programs (e.g. 
(DeZure 2010; Repko 2008; Klein 1990)). Two epistemological challenges figure consistently in all three strands 
of literature: First, communication across domains can be difficult due to differences in the concepts used in 
different domains. Second, integration across domains can be difficult due to differences in the epistemological 
standards of the domains involved. We describe these two epistemological challenges in more detail in 
sections 2.1. and 2.2. below4, and analyse the kinds of expertise needed overcome them in section 3.  
2.1 Communicating across domains 
One of the key challenges to interdisciplinary problem solving that figures prominently in the literature is the 
communication challenge that arise from the fact that different concepts are used within different domains to 
describe aspects of the same or overlapping natural phenomena. These conceptual differences between 
domains can be of different kinds. First, scientists from different domains may develop different concepts to 
describe a phenomenon. For example, Lélé and Norgaard (2005) have shown that within the domain of soil 
science, different taxonomies of soil are used when addressing questions related to, for example, fertility or 
sustainability. Second, scientists from different domains may not use the same concepts in precisely the same 
ways. There are many examples of this from both research and education settings, such as differences in the 
meaning of the term ‘gene’ within research in the biological sciences (Rheinberger, Müller-Wille 2010), or 
differences in what is meant by ‘thermodynamical system’ in textbooks from physics, chemistry and 
mechanical engineering and how that leads to different conceptions of energy conservation (Christiansen, 
Rump 2008).  
In order to communicate across domain boundaries, scientists engaged in interdisciplinary collaborations often 
need to take recourse to a slightly simplified language. Based on a detailed study of the interdisciplinary 
collaboration between scientists and engineers at CERN, Galison (1997) described how experimenters, 
theorists and instrument makers developed a “pidgin language” by reducing mathematical structure, 
suppressing exceptional cases, simplifying explanatory structure, and minimizing internal links between 
theoretical structures.  
Similarly, Petrie (1976) has argued that a minimum requirement for interdisciplinary work is to learn the 
observational categories and the meaning of the key concepts of the other discipline (Petrie 1976, p. 37). For 
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higher education this implies that an important aspect of training students for interdisciplinary problem solving 
is to teach them the key concepts from a number of different domains. This implication is also prominently 
reflected in the educational literature where it is frequently stressed that the learning outcomes of 
interdisciplinary programs need to include that students should be able to define key terms from several 
domains and to develop a common vocabulary with collaborators from other domains (Borrego, Newswander 
& McNair 2007). At the same time, it is also often stressed that this necessarily results in fewer topics being 
taught in traditional ways, which potentially limits the students’ chances to develop a sufficient cognitive depth 
to eventually make research contributions in any domain (Davies, Devlin 2007; Golde, Gallagher 1999). We 
return briefly to these implications in section 3 after we have introduced the other important challenge to 
interdisciplinary problem solving. 
2.2 Doing integration: Negotiating differences in epistemological standards 
Interdisciplinary problem solving is characterized by aiming for a significant degree of integration in the final 
results. Achieving integration requires more than fluent communication. It requires that the participants bridge 
the differences between the involved domains in the standards used when selecting relevant problems and 
standards used to evaluate potential solutions to relevant problems (Borrego, Newswander 2010, Spelt et al. 
2009, Klein 1990, Repko 2008). We refer to these standards collectively as epistemological standards. Studies 
of interdisciplinary collaborations in general (Eigenbrode et al. 2007) as well as detailed case studies of, for 
example, research in the biological sciences (Brigandt 2010) show that, in practice, it is often differences in 
epistemological standards for what counts as good evidence and a satisfactory explanation that can become 
either a source of disagreement or a source of mutual enrichment in interdisciplinary problem solving. Studies 
further show that if the differences in epistemological standards are discussed openly and constructively they 
can create a fruitful synergy leading to better research (O’Rourke, Crowley 2013). On the other hand, if the 
differences are not discussed they can cause the problem solving process to stall (Öberg 2009). In the literature 
on interdisciplinarity in higher education this is reflected in the description of learning outcomes such as the 
students being able to compare and contrast research values from different domains (Borrego, Newswander & 
McNair 2007; Lattuca, Voigt & Fath 2004) 
Open discussion of epistemological standards requires that scientists participating in interdisciplinary problem 
solving have a fairly detailed understanding of their own epistemological standards and how they differ from 
those of their collaborators (Bromme 2000). Knowledge of epistemological standards forms part of what Flavell 
(1979) called meta-cognitive knowledge. Developing meta-cognitive knowledge in turn requires meta-reflective 
skills5; i.e. skills in critically reflecting on the problem solving practices that a person is most familiar with. 
Meta-reflective skills include general skills in critical thinking which are valuable for analysing explicit 
arguments and reasoning patterns, but meta-reflective skills also include skills in identifying and articulating 
assumptions and standards implicit in specific problem solving practices, for example, specific types of 
experimentation or computer simulation techniques. To this end it will be important be to have some training 
in using the most relevant concepts and distinctions developed within science studies for this very purpose. 
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Since problem solving practices are to some extent domain specific, the skills relevant for analysing these will 
also to some extent be domain specific. In some domains it will, for instance, be important to be able to reflect 
critically on the use of model organisms or randomized controlled trials in a problem solving process using 
relevant concepts and distinctions developed within science studies. In the case of randomized controlled trials 
it will, for instance, be relevant to draw on analyses from science studies on causality (Hitchcock 2012) and 
probability (Hájek 2012). In other domains it will be more relevant to reflect on the use of mathematical 
models or computer simulations.        
Since meta-reflective skills are applied and trained in reflection on personal experience, it is important to have 
some experience with relevant problem solving practices before engaging in meta-reflection on these; the 
more and the more varied the experience, the better. Once developed, meta-reflective skills will enable 
scientists to continuously develop a more nuanced and realistic view of the epistemological standards of the 
domains they are trained within.  
3 Expertise in interdisciplinary problem solving 
In science studies, a distinction between contributory and interactional expertise introduced by Harry Collins 
and Robert Evans (2007, 2006, 2004) has become widely used for analysing interdisciplinary collaboration and 
communication among scientists and between scientists and non-scientists (for an overview see chapter 2). In 
this section we shall argue that this distinction can be adapted to higher education to describe the various 
kinds of expertise that science and engineering programs should aim to train their students for.6 At the same 
time, we shall argue that research from higher education can also enrich the discussion of expertise within 
science studies and in particular that an additional category that we shall call integrational expertise is needed 
to describe the expertise aimed for in interdisciplinary programs. 
In their work on contributory and interactional expertise, Collins and Evans have adopted a skill based view of 
expertise. Hence, on their account, expertise is not only characterized by the amount of factual knowledge that 
an individual has accumulated, but also by the tacit knowledge gained by the individual. Expertise is therefore 
primarily characterized by what the expert can do and only secondarily by what the expert must know in order 
to do this. This is in keeping with the development in education towards evaluating student skills as well as 
factual knowledge (Anderson, et. al. 2001). In this paper, we take expertise to be sets of skills that allow an 
individual to perform certain tasks that are deemed important by a wider community in a way that benefits 
that community.  
Originally, Collins and Evans introduced the distinction between contributory and interactional expertise in a 
given domain as the distinction between having “enough expertise to contribute to the science of the field 
being analysed” and having ”enough expertise to interact interestingly with participants” from the field, 
respectively (Collins, Evans 2002, p. 254). Elaborating on this distinction, we shall characterize contributory 
expertise with respect to a given scientific domain as the ability to make a significant contribution to the 
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development of the practice of the domain. By a significant contribution to a domain’s development we 
understand a non-trivial contribution to a study published in a journal or presented at a conference where it is 
received and assessed by other scientists from the domain. A non-trivial contribution includes as a minimum a 
contribution to the conception or design the study or the execution of the study, for instance through a non-
trivial contribution to the analysis of data, or the interpretation of data, and in addition a non-trivial 
contribution to the final communication of the results, for example, by writing or critically reviewing significant 
parts of the manuscript. On this characterization, contributory expertise in a scientific domain requires not only 
mastery of the domain’s concepts, but also skills related to the construction of novel scientific results such as 
gathering and/or analysing of data, construction and performance of experiments, calculations or simulations. 
In contrast, for example, performing routine laboratory work following a plan conceived by others is not seen 
as a significant contribution (although it can, of course, be quite labour intensive)7 
The paradigmatic example of a contributory expert is therefore the monodisciplinary specialist. As noted 
earlier, there is some concern that the broad span of interdisciplinary programs prevents students from 
learning enough to achieve contributory expertise in any domain. Whether contributory expertise in some 
domain is a necessary condition for engaging in interdisciplinary problem solving is a question beyond the 
scope of this paper. Our main concern is the question of what kind of expertise scientists need in order to, first, 
communicate with other scientists who do have contributory expertise in the domain, second, participate in 
the integration of cognitive resources from these domains and the domains which the scientist is most familiar 
with. We argue that overcoming these specific challenges requires a kind of expertise that goes beyond 
contributory expertise in any one domain, and that contributory expertise in some domain is therefore not 
sufficient for engaging in interdisciplinary problem solving. 
As described above, to communicate across domains scientists need to be able to understand and use the key 
concepts of the domains they are communicating about. This implies that the collaborators should be able to 
express claims from their own domain in a simplified form understandable to their collaborators and also to 
understand such simplified claims formulated by their collaborators from other domains. However, for the 
purpose of communication it is not essential that they can actually contribute to the ongoing research in these 
other domains, and skills in performing advanced experiments, detailed mathematical manipulations are 
therefore not necessary. We characterize interactional expertise in a domain as some degree of familiarity with 
the concepts used in a domain while not necessarily having the further skills needed to perform experiments 
and detailed mathematical manipulations. This characterization of interactional expertise captures the 
requirement often described in interdisciplinary programs that students need to achieve “adequacy” in 
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multiple disciplines without necessarily mastering them fully (see (Borrego, Newswander 2008) for a review as 
well as (Boix Mansilla, Duraisingh 2007, Repko 2008, Borrego, Newswander & McNair 2007).  
A rich literature exists within science studies on the usefulness of the distinction between interactional and 
contributory expertise for the understanding of communication and collaboration among scientists and 
between scientists and non-scientists. For example, it has been argued that the expertise possessed by 
sociologists of science (Collins, Evans 2007, pp. 31), journalists (Reich 2012) and specialized interpreters 
(Ribeiro 2007), whose main task is to communicate about or analyse the scientific practices they are in contact 
with, but not themselves contributors to, can best be described as some degree of interactional expertise. 
Similarly, Collins and Evans have argued that interactional expertise is important for communication and 
collaboration among scientists, and that interdisciplinary problem solving would be impossible without 
interactional expertise (Collins, Evans 2007, p. 32).  
However, although in all these cases a necessary requirement for the activity is to be able to understand and 
use key concepts from the domain in question, there are important differences between the further skills 
needed for a) collaborating with other scientific domains with the aim of creating new integrated results 
acceptable to contributory experts from the involved domains, b) analysing existing scientific results with the 
aim of creating new results within a separate domain such as sociology or philosophy of science that are not 
integrated with the results analysed, and c) communicating  existing scientific results to an audience that is not 
(or not yet) contributory experts such as it happens in science communication and science education. We shall 
here not go into the two latter kinds of activities, but focus solely on the integration of cognitive resources 
from different scientific domains with the aim of creating new scientific results acceptable to contributory 
experts from the involved domains. 
As described above, overcoming the integration challenge requires that the scientists performing the 
integration have a realistic and fairly elaborate notion of what their own epistemological standards are, and 
how they differ from those of their collaborators. Gaining this kind of meta-cognitive knowledge in turn 
requires relevant meta-reflective skills. To engage in interdisciplinary problem solving drawing on a set of 
different domains, scientists therefore need a combination of interactional expertise in the relevant domains 
and relevant meta-reflective skills. We call this combination integrational expertise in the set of domains 
involved in the interdisciplinary problem solving process. Characterized in this way integrational expertise is the 
kind of expertise needed to overcome both the challenge of efficient communication and the challenge of 
integration described above. An important teaching goal for interdisciplinary programs should therefore be 
that their students gain integrational expertise.  
In the following we shall examine integrational expertise in more detail and analyse how different forms of 
integrational expertise are relevant to different kinds of interdisciplinary problem solving. In section 5 we shall 
briefly discuss how programs in higher education can train students to achieve integrational expertise.   
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4 The fine-structure of integration in science 
We start our analysis of the fine-structure of integrational expertise by examining different degrees of 
interactional expertise, from the very basic to the very advanced. In the one end of the spectrum, basic 
interactional expertise involves only familiarity with the most basic concepts of the domain in question. Often, 
scientists will have obtained such basic interactional expertise in a number of domains through the various 
introductory courses or similar activities early in their education. This basic interactional expertise may suffice 
for a scientist to establish the communication required for an interdisciplinary collaboration with scientists 
from another domain (Gorman, Groves & Shrager 2004; Petrie 1976). However, basic interactional expertise 
alone will not enable the scientist to engage in any substantial way in the practice of the other domain, he will 
therefore have to defer substantially to the contributory expertise of his collaborators. In collaborations where 
some collaborators have only very basic interactional expertise, there will therefore have to be a strong 
division of labour among the collaborators.  
In the other end of the spectrum, advanced interactional expertise involves mastery of a significant part of the 
concepts as well as some of the practices of the domain. As students specialize and get more and more 
advanced training in a domain, their interactional expertise will gradually increase. Typically, scientists will in 
this way have obtained a relatively advanced interactional expertise in a few domains closely related to the 
domain in which they have contributory expertise. Since this advanced interactional expertise enables them to 
perform more advanced tasks within the domain in question, labour need not be as strongly divided as for 
scientists with only basic interactional expertise within each other’s domains8.  
The close link between basic interactional expertise and strong division of labour has sometimes led to the 
view that such collaborations cannot be truly integrative but necessarily remain a multidisciplinary 
juxtaposition of approaches, and that consequently collaborators do not learn from each other (Borrego, 
Newswander & McNair 2007). However, as we shall argue below, this view overlooks important integrative 
aspects of collaborations where labour is divided; aspects that require specific meta-reflective skills that 
therefore need to be taught. 
The opposition between interdisciplinary collaborations characterized by mutual learning and multidisciplinary 
collaboration characterized by division of labour is too simplified. As described by Rossini & Porter (1979) it is 
only in one particular framework for interdisciplinary problem solving that scientists from different domains 
interact until they have all acquired a high degree of interactional expertise in each other’s domains and jointly 
reach a solution. Another framework for interdisciplinary problem solving is a group of negotiating experts who 
exchange contributions in an iterative process until a solution is found. Andersen & Wagenknecht elaborated 
on this analysis and argued that for the latter framework where expertise remains distributed and group 
members therefore need to defer to each other’s expertise, the collaborators are to some extent epistemically 
dependent on each other and will therefore have to have trust in each other (Andersen, Wagenknecht 2013). 
However, in this process scientists do not trust each other blindly (Wagenknecht 2014). Instead, they calibrate 
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their trust in each other either directly by scrutinizing the work of their collaborators in detail, or indirectly by 
scrutinizing only the general argument structures and supplementing by referring to sociological indicators of 
trustworthiness such as reputation and publication record.9 However, scientists can only perform a direct 
calibration of trust in areas where they themselves have contributory or very advanced expertise. Otherwise, 
they will have to rely solely on indirect calibration of trust. Thus, engaging in interdisciplinary problem solving 
involving domains in which a scientist has only basic interactional expertise requires that she has strong skills in 
indirect calibration of trust. An important part of the skills needed to perform indirect calibration of trust are 
the general skills in critical thinking that we described above as one important component of the meta-
reflective skills that students need to acquire in order to engage in interdisciplinary problem solving. Hence, the 
close link between basic interactional expertise and division of labour has implications for which meta-
reflective skills are most important for scientists engaged in interdisciplinary problem solving. If scientists have 
only a basic interactional expertise there will often be need for the general critical thinking skills that is used 
when calibrating trust indirectly. On the one hand, a high degree of interactional expertise means better 
possibilities for developing the aspect of meta-reflective skills that is domain specific and which is used when 
integrating resources from different domains. There is thus a difference in the kind of integrational expertise 
needed in different types of interdisciplinary problem solving, but also a difference in how strong domain 
specific meta-reflective skills can be developed depending on the degree of interactional expertise that a 
person has in a given domain.   
Rather than looking at the different degrees of interactional expertise and seeing which meta-reflective skills 
they call for, we can describe different types of interdisciplinary problem solving that interdisciplinary 
programs can aim to prepare their students for and analyse which forms of integrational expertise that they 
each call for. Consider first, interdisciplinary problem solving that integrates cognitive resources from many 
different domains. This requires some degree of interactional expertise in all domains covered. But in programs 
covering many domains it will not be practically possible to train students to develop advanced interactional 
expertise all of them. It is often overlooked that this means that meta-reflective skills, especially the strong 
critical thinking skills required for indirect calibration of trust in other experts, become very important in cases 
where scientists have only basic interactional expertise.   
Consider next, interdisciplinary problem solving that integrates cognitive resources from domains with very 
different epistemological standards. Spelt et al. (2009) observed that such programs are likely to experience 
more difficulties than more narrowly defined programs. Recognizing and bridging substantial differences in 
epistemological standards involves patient and detailed discussions and challenges scientists to explicate, 
defend and negotiate their own epistemological standards. Wide interdisciplinary problem solving therefore 
requires strong meta-reflective skills, both the domain independent skills in critical thinking, but also the more 
domain specific skills in explicating tacit assumptions and values in the problem solving practices of a given 
domain. In contrast, narrow interdisciplinary problem solving in which the cognitive resources to be integrated 
have their origin in closely related domains does not require meta-reflective skills to the same degree. 
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Interdisciplinary programs that span domains with very different epistemological standards therefore 
especially need to train students to obtain meta-reflective skills.   
Finally, it is often argued that interdisciplinary programs are needed in order to educate students to help solve 
the grand challenges that face us today. This means that the student, using the problem as a starting point, 
should be able to identify the domains that can contribute to the solution to the problem, and perhaps even 
identify the relevant experts to draw on. To be able to identify domains that can contribute to the solution to a 
given problem, the student will need to have at least basic interactional expertise in a number of different 
domains. However, if, due to time constraints, basic interactional expertise is all that can reasonably be 
attained within these domains then the student will also need strong skills in indirect calibration of trust in 
order to identify the right experts within these domains that should contribute to the solution of a given 
problem. To this end, strong meta-reflective skills, especially the more general critical thinking skills, will be 
important.      
In summary, different kinds of interdisciplinary problem solving call for different forms of integrational 
expertise. If many domains are involved in an interdisciplinary problem solving process it will be important to 
have strong skills in indirect calibration of trust. If wide interdisciplinary problem solving is attempted, it will be 
important to have strong meta-reflective skills, including the domain specific meta-reflective skills used to 
explicate tacit assumptions and values. Finally, if interdisciplinary problem solving takes a societal challenge as 
its starting point, it will be important to have at least basic interactional expertise in a number of domains 
combined with strong skills in indirect calibration of trust.      
5 Teaching integrational expertise 
Klein argues that many alleged interdisciplinary curricula are actually “multidisciplinary assemblage[s] of 
disciplinary courses” (Klein 2010, p. 17). On our analysis, the problem with such programs is that while they can 
provide the interactional expertise required for communication across domains, they fail to provide sufficient 
meta-reflective skills necessary for integration between domains.  
The Kuhnian framework often drawn upon when discussing the challenges of interdisciplinary does offer an 
explanation of this ((Kuhn 1977, 1996 pp. 187) see also (Andersen 2000)). Kuhn described how in traditional 
higher education in science epistemological standards from a given domain are taught through exemplars that 
display the standards to the student. These are then internalized through exercises where students solve 
problems similar to the exemplar problems. However, while this traditional approach may be efficient in 
getting the students to accept the epistemological standards of a given domain, it does not necessarily 
encourage the student to explicate and reflect on them to the extent required when bringing the 
epistemological standards from different domains to bear on an integrated solution to an interdisciplinary 
problem. Kuhn’s analysis is on this point vindicated by research in science education showing that simply 
learning the key concepts of a number of scientific domains does not ensure the development of relevant 
meta-reflective skills (Klein 1990, Christiansen; Rump 2008; Spelt et al. 2009, DeZure 2010; Borrego, 
Newswander 2010). Similarly, literature on Nature of Science (NoS) in science education often emphasize  that 
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science education focused on cognitive content alone does not automatically give students the kind of meta-
cognitive knowledge about science that is required for interdisciplinary problem solving, such as knowledge 
about differences in epistemological standards. This literature therefore highlights the need to give the 
students opportunities for explicit guided reflection (Abd-El-Khalick 2013). 
In developing new initiatives to train meta-reflective skills, important insights can be drawn from both the NoS 
literature as well as novel initiatives to aid practicing scientists develop meta-reflective skills. Based on her 
experience from working in environmental science, Öberg (2009) recommends that interdisciplinary research 
groups explicitly discuss simple questions about the quality of the research produced in the collaboration. A 
similar approach has been developed by Eigenbrode and collaborators in the so-called “Toolbox Project” 
(Eigenbrode et al. 2007) that runs workshops for interdisciplinary collaborations in which tailored questions 
about various philosophical aspects of research are discussed in order to engage scientists in reflection and 
refine their meta-cognitive knowledge. Similar to Öberg’s experience, scientists who have participated in these 
workshops generally find them relevant and helpful in relation to their interdisciplinary work (O’Rourke, 
Crowley 2013, p. 1946). The questions covered in the seminars described by Öberg and the Toolbox Project are 
philosophical in nature and aim to address the differences in epistemological standards present in the 
collaboration.  A number of useful conceptual tools for handling such questions have been developed by 
philosophy, history and sociology of science10. Teaching simple versions of these tools to students can have a 
significant effect on the students’ ability to engage with these difficult questions about the nature of research 
and innovation (as illustrated in (Scharmann et al. 2005)). Hence, what we suggest is that meta-reflective skills 
can be developed in interdisciplinary programs by introducing opportunities for explicit reflection, either as 
part of core science courses, or in the form of specific courses devoted explicitly to reflection and meta-
cognition.   
6 Conclusion 
The challenge facing educators in higher interdisciplinary education is to train the future contributors to 
interdisciplinary problem solving. We characterized two prominent challenges faced in interdisciplinary 
problem solving: establishing efficient communication across domains, and the challenge to identify and bridge 
differences in the epistemological standards of the domains represented in the collaboration.   
Interactional expertise has been described as important in interdisciplinary problem solving. We showed that it 
is indeed relevant for overcoming the challenge to establish efficient communication, but insufficient for 
integrating cognitive resources from different domains. To this end meta-reflective skills are also needed. We 
therefore characterized integrational expertise as the combination of relevant interactional expertise and 
meta-reflective skills and argued that this is the kind of expertise that interdisciplinary programs should train 
students to gain. We further argued that different interdisciplinary programs should emphasize different forms 
                                                          
10
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to review this literature. For general reviews of history and philosophy of science 
relevant to education, see (e.g. (Duschl 2008; Matthews 1994)). 
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of integrational expertise depending on the kind of interdisciplinary problem solving they want their graduates 
to be able to engage in. 
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